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The Background for the Study
THE earliest estimates of real wages for any part of the period 1890—
1914 can be found in Bulletin 53 of the Bureau of Labor.1 This
bulletin brought together the retail prices of food collected for the
Eighteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner of Labor,2 then in
press, and the money wage series of the Nineteenth Annual Report,3
then in preparation. These two sets of data were combined into two
series of index numbers of "the purchasing power of wages measured
by retail prices of food," which were maintained by regular collection
of new data and published in subsequent bulletins4 until 1907. The
two indexes, one based on hourly wages and the other on full-time
weekly wages (hourly wages times standard or full-time hours), are
shown in the first column of Tables 2 and 3. The hourly index shows
a small, irregular rise over the period; the weekly index has no
appreciable trend. The money wage series used in constructing these
indexes covered sixty-seven industries, not confined to manufac-
turing.5 The wage statistics for each industry were simple averages of
relatives for occupations, and the industries were combined using as
weights the aggregate wage bill of each industry according to the
Census of 1900. The index of retail food prices was an average of
relatives for thirty food items weighted by expenditures on these
items in 1901 for a subsample of 2,567 families. It was taken from
Part I of the Eighteenth Annual Report.
Mter 1907 the regular work of the Bureau of Labor was interrupted
for four years, apparently by the intensive inquiry then made into the
conditions of labor of women and children. When the work was
resumed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) after 1911, it was
1July1904, p. 723.
2Costof Living and Retail Prices of Food, 1904.
Wages and Hours of Labor, 1905.
Nos. 59, 65, 71, and 77.
5Thenonmanufacturing industries (as defined in the Census of Manufactures, 1905)
were blacksmithing and horseshoeing; building trades; men's custom work; and streets
and sewers, municipal work. In addition, two industries were included that were then
considered part of manufacturing and are not now: illuminating and heating gas, and
steam railroad cars (now excluded if built by railroad companies).
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TABLE 2







77 Rubinow Jones LambersonManufacturing
1890 97.9 98.3 97.9 97.5 95
1891 96.6 96.6 96.2 96.0 98
1892 98.9 98.7 98.4 98.5 98
1893 96.6 97.2 96.9 97.1 101
1894 98.2 99.7 99.2 98.8 102
1895 100.5 101.5 100.8 101.1 101
1896 104.4 105.0 104.7 105.3 102
1897 103.4 103.0 103.4 103.6 100
1898 101,5 100.5 101.5 101.2 100
1899 102.5 100.6 101.9 101.6 101
1900 104.4 101.6 103.6 103.7 101
1901 102.7 98.6 101.7 100.1 100
1902 101.2 97.7 101.0 98.5 101
1903 105.4 100.7 104.7 102.2 100
1904 104.7 100.0 104.1 101.7 101
1905 105.8 102.8 106.4 103.1 103
1906 107.3 102.7 106.8 103.9 103
1907 106.8 102.7 107.2 104.2 101
1908 98.8 103.0 101.2 102
1909 94.7 98.5 97.2 102
1910 93.0 96.5 95.1 100
1911 95.3 99.0 97.8 98
1912 91.8 95.0 94.6 102
1913 96.1 102
1914 96.5 102
aAllseries except Douglas's show the purchasing power of wages in terms of food
only. For sources and methods, see text.
much changed. The number of food items whose prices were collected
dropped from thirty to fifteen. The amount of wage data collected
within each industry was increased, but the number of industries
covered decreased sharply. For some industries, union rates were
collected, rather than rates taken from employer payrolls. Most of the
new series ran back through the missing years 1907—11, but no official
average has ever been published of the new wage series for 1907—14,
nor, of course, any official continuation of the series on the purchasing
power of wages in terms of food.
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TABLE 3




77 Rubinow Jones LambersonHansenb Manufacturing
1890 98.6 99.4 98.9 98.4 94 96
1891 97.1 97.5 97.1 96.8 95 99
1892 99.4 99.4 99.1 99.3 98 99
1893 96.9 97.6 97.3 97.5 97 101
1894 98.0 98.9 98.4 98.7 99 101
1895 100.6 102.2 101.4 101.2 101 102
1896 104.2 104.7 104.4 104.6 104 101
1897 103.0 102.5 102.9 103.2 107 100
1898 101.2 100.1 101.1 100.5 104 100
1899 101.7 99.8 101.1 100.3 101 100
1900 103.0 100.2 102.1 101.6 99 100
1901 100.7 96.8 99.8 97.6 101 99
1902 98.5 94.3 98.4 95.1 101 99
1903 101.8 97.3 101.3 97.6 100 98
1904 100.4 96.0 99.9 96.9 100 98
1905 101.4 98.6 102.1 98.3 102 100
1906 102.4 98.0 101.9 98.6 101 99
1907 101.5 97.7 102.0 98.2 100 97
1908— 93.0 97.3 94.6 102 97
1909 89.4 92.9 90.7 99 98
1910 87.2 90.6 87.8 98 95
1911 88.9 92.4 90.1 100 93
1912 85.3 88.4 85.9 100 96
1913 86.8 98 95
1914 87.0 98 95
aAll of these indexes except the last two show the purchasing power of wages in terms
of food only. For sources and methods, see text.
bConvertedfrom the original base 1913=100.
In 1914, I. M. Rubinow published the first index of real wages
covering the period after 1907.6 His money wage series covered the
building trades and fourteen manufacturing industries for which
continuous data were available since 1890. (No use was made of
the data available, up to 1907, for other industries.) After 1907 the
data underlying the series for the building trades and five other
6"TheRecentTrendof Real Wages,"American Economic Review, December 1914,
pp.793—8 17.
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series7 were union rates; the data underlying the nine remaining series8
were from payrolls. For all the payroll industries except carbuilding,
the indexes used were computed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
were employment-weighted averages of occupational relatives. For
carbuilding and the union-rate industries, Rubinow computed simple
averages of relatives. The fifteen industries were combined in a simple
average. On the price side, Rubinow used a weighted index, computed
by the Bureau, including only the fifteen food items whose prices had
been collected continuously since 1890.
Rubinow's results, which indicate a sharp fall in real wages after
1907, are shown in the second column of Tables 2 and 3. His estimates
are based throughout on the continuous series only. They differ,
therefore, from those of Bulletin 77 even prior to 1907. Rubinow
states his conclusions as follows: "When confronted with a rapidly
rising price movement (accompanied as it was by a violent growth of
profits), the American wage-worker, notwithstanding his strenuous
efforts to adjust wages to these new price conditions, notwithstanding
all the picturesque I.W.W.-ism, new unionism, and the modish sabo-
tage, has been losing surely and not even slowly, so that the sum total
of economic progress of this country for the last quarter of a century
appears to be a loss of from 10 to 15 per cen.t in his earning power."9
In 1917, F. W. Jones published an amended version of Rubinow's
results.1° The sole change consisted of linking the price index of
fifteen food items to the older series of thirty items at 1907, rather
than using the fifteen items throughout. Jones' series are shown in the
third column of Tables 2 and 3. Although they fall somewhat less than
Rubinow's, they do not materially alter his conclusions. Indeed,
Jones writes, "The doctrine so popular in certain quarters that while
the rich have grown rapidly richer in recent years the poor have also
steadily risen in the scale of economic welfare, has no foundation in
fact." 11
In1921, Paul H. Douglas and Frances Lamberson published an
article bringing Rubinow's series down to 1918.12 Rejecting Jones's
'Bakers,marble and stone cutters, foundry and machine shops, book and job printing,
and newspaper printing.
8Cottongoods, woolen goods, silk goods, boots and shoes, knit goods. lumber, mill-
work, furniture, and carbuilding.
9"Trendof Real Wages," p. 812.
10"RealWages in Recent Years," American Economic Review, June 1917, pp. 317—330.
11Ibid.,p.330,
12"TheMovement of Real Wages, 1890—1918," AmericanEconomic Review, Sep-
tember 1921, pp. 409—426.
9THE BACKGROUND FOR THE STUD Y
improvement, they returned to the index of fifteen food items. On the
wage side, they found that continuous data were available untiF 1918
for only ten of Rubinow's fifteen industries, of which only three had
payroll data.13 New indexes were computed for these ten industries
for 1912—18, based on simple averages of occupational relatives, and
these were spliced to Rubinow's series at 1912. The final wage indexes
were simple averages of the ten industry indexes. Since only ten
industries were used even prior to 1912, the results differ slightly from
Rubinow's before that date. These results are shown in the fourth
column of Tables 2 and 3. They show a slight rise of real earnings
from 1912 to 1914, but not nearly enough to offset the fall from 1907
to 1912.
In 1925 Alvin H. Hansen made another computation of real wages
for this period.14 He accepted the full-time weekly money wage
series of Douglas and Lamberson, but computed a new cost-of-living
index. This included the BLS index of the retail price of food (based
on thirty items to 1907 and fifteen items thereafter) with a weight of
40; and the BLS wholesale price indexes of cloths and clothing
(weight 17), fuel and light (weight 6), and house furnishings (weight 5).
The weights are approximations of the pattern of family expenditures
shown by the 1918 budget study of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.'5
Thus, for the first time, the purchasing power of wages during this
period was not expressed entirely in terms of food.
Hansen's index is shown in the fifth column of Table 3. It shows
no trend; although 1914 lies slightly above 1890, it lies slightly below
the average for 1890—99. This flatness implies an increase in real
hourly earnings, for which Hansen made no index. Hansen comments
on the fall in real wages from the peak reached by his index in 1897,
explaining it as a result of a lag of wages behind prices during an
inflation. He states, in part: "Rising prices amount in fact to a
redistribution of the national income in favor of the entrepreneurial
class. It amounts to an enforced taxation of wage-earners, salaried
persons, investors and landlords with long-term rent contracts. In the
period from 1897 to 1915 when real wages were falling in spite of an
enormous increase in national production, business profits far outran
13Theomitted industries are silk goods, knit goods, lumber, furniture, and car-
building. In addition, only union rate data were now available for miliwork, for which
Rubinow had used payroll data.
14"FactorsAffecting the Trend of Real Wages," AmericanEconomicReview, March
1925, pp. 25-42 and 294.
15Costof Living in the United States, BLS Bulletin No. 357, May 1924.
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thegeneral price level."16 Elsewhere he adds, "Undoubtedly the lag
of real wages behind production from 1897 to 1915 was to some
extent the result of the increasing scarcity of land."17
It was against this background that Douglas's book18 appeared.
Of course, Real Wages covers far more than manufacturing. We shall
be concerned here with its manufacturing series only. It is one of the
virtues of this work that, for the first time, it separated wages in
manufacturing from wages in the building trades and presented
manufacturing wages alone. The number of manufacturing industries
covered was increased to fourteen by interpolation in some of the
series containing gaps. Six of the series were based on union rates19
and eight on payroll data.2° Within industries, the averages were
weighted averages of actual rates (rather than of relatives); the indus-
tries were combined using census employment weights.
For the cost-of-living estimates, Douglas followed Hansen in using
wholesale prices where retail prices were not available. The former
were used for clothing, furniture, and spirits and tobacco, and for fuel
and light until 1907. The retail prices of gas and coal, collected by the
BLS since 1907, were used for 1907—14. The food index used twenty-
nine items at retail until 1907 and fifteen thereafter. The fourteen
omitted items were continued by means of wholesale prices until 19 14
and throughout the period for eleven items for which retail prices had
not been collected before 1907. All wholesale prices (both of foods and
nonfoods) were adjusted to a presumed retail basis according to the
differences between the wholesale and retail price indexes of identical
food items. The various group indexes were combined using family
expenditure weights for 1901 from the Eighteenth Annual Report.
Douglas's results are shown in the last column of Tables 2 and 3.
16Hansen,"Factors Affecting Real Wages," p. 40. Several economic historians,
including Wesley C. Mitchell and Earl J. Hamilton, have noted lags of wages behind
prices in inflations of the nineteenth century and earlier.Like Hansen, they argued that
this increased profits.However, inflations in the United States since 1914 have clearly
been accompanied by rising real wages.It is not clear whether this difference represents
a change in the behavior of wages in recent inflations or whether it represents an
improvement in the quality of the data on which the wage and price series are based.
Hansen's use of weekly earnings deflated by consumers' prices is inappropriate for
drawing inferences about profits. Hourly earnings deflated by the prices of the products
produced would be more appropriate.
17Ibid.,p. 36.
18RealWages in the United States, 1890—1 926, Boston, 1930.
19Metaltrades, granite and stone. book and job printing, newspaper printing, plan-
ing mills, and bakers.
20Cotton,boots and shoes, clothing, hosiery and knit goods, woolens, lumber, iron
and steel, and slaughtering and meat packing.
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The real hourly earnings series shows a slight rise over the whole
period covered, for the first time since Bulletin 77. However, much of
the rise occurs in the single year 1890—91, and all of it by 1894. In 1914
the series on real weekly earnings lies slightly further below its 1890—99
average than does Hansen's.
After the appearance of Douglas's book, discussion of the course
of real wages before 1914 came to a halt. Perhaps this was because
Douglas had made most of the possible refinements in processing the
BLS data. Perhaps, since his series showed some slight rise in real
hourly earnings, there no longer seemed to be any problem to solve.
Perhaps, too, as time passed there was less interest in the period
before World War I.
Nevertheless, the passing of time heightens the uneasiness that one
feels on reviewing Douglas's results. We have become accustomed to
the idea that continuously improving technology, the accumulation
of physical capital, and rising levels of education have combined to
bring steady, substantial improvement in the standard of living of all
major groups in our population.2' Was the material progress of
manufacturing workers really interrupted for almost a quarter of a
century? If so, why?
A second puzzle may also be considered. Douglas estimates that
real full-time weekly earnings in manufacturing fell about 1 per cent
from 1890 to 1914, and 5percent from the decade average 1890—99
to 1914. He also estimates that this fall in real weekly earnings was
accompanied by a reduction in full-time weekly hours from 60.0 in
1890 to 55.2in1914. The historical record for longer periods suggests
that an increase in real hourly earnings will be used in part to increase
real earnings exclusive of leisure (to increase the consumption of
goods and services) and in part to reduce hours of work (to increase
the consumption of leisure). This record is entirely consistent with a
theory of the demand for leisure in which it is a normal commodity
for which the demand is relatively stable over time.22 But the record
as a whole does not suggest that leisure is so strongly preferred that
workers will consume all of an increase in hourly earnings in the form
of leisure and will, in addition, cut into their previous consumption of
goods and services to shorten hours. Douglas's findings suggest a
21Foran eloquent statement of this view, see Solomon Fabricant, Economic Progress
andEconomic Change, Thirty-fourthAnnual Report, National Bureau of Economic
Research, New York, 1954.
22SeeH. 0. Lewis, "Hours of Work and Hours of Leisure," Proceedings of the Ninth
Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association, 1957, pp. 196—206.
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strongunexplained shift of preferences toward leisure during this
period (unless it is assumed that shorter hours were forced on unwill-
ing workers by employers, governments, or unions, which seems most
unlikely). Putting the matter differently, we can say that Douglas's
results might be easier to accept if they showed hourly earnings,
weekly hours, and weekly earnings all unchanged, implying a com-
plete absence of progress. As they now stand they show modest pro-
gress used entirely to shorten the workweek, and still failing to
account for all the shortening that occurred.
In the writings of Rubinow and Hansen we have already encoun-
tered one explanation for the failure of real wages to rise. They stated
that wages lagged behind prices, resulting in abnormally high profits.
Our willingness to accept this explanation must be tempered by the
experience of more recent periods of rising prices. Douglas shows a
rise of 11 per cent in real hourly earnings in manufacturing from 1914
to 1920, a period in which the cost of living more than doubled. More
recently, real average hourly earnings in manufacturing have increased
62 per cent from 1939 to 1957, a period in which the Consumer Price
Index doubled.
Another possible cause of the failure of real wages to rise in this
period is the closing of the frontier. For earlier periods it has been
argued that the existence of free or cheap land in the West served as a
"safety valve" for labor. It absorbed part of the inflow of immigrants,
and part of the natural increase of population in the rural East that
might otherwise have gone into urban employment. Perhaps there was
also some direct movement of eastern urban workers to the frontier,
though they were more likely to become workers in frontier towns
than farmers.
By 1900, however, the pull of the frontier must have been greatly
weakened. A distinguished economic historian writes: "By the close
of the century the supply of free and fertile farming land had almost
disappeared."23
After about 1898, the rate of growth of agricultural output
decreased sharply. In the sixteen years from 1898 to 1914, agricultural
output increased 22 per cent; in the preceding sixteen years, it had
increased 46 per cent.24 Urban population continued to grow
23ChesterW. Wright, Economic History of the United States, 2nd ed., New York,
1949, p. 462.
24FrederickStrauss and Louis H. Bean, Gross Farm IncomeandIndices of Farm
Production and Prices in the United States, 1869—1 937, U.S. Department of Agriculture
Technical Bulletin No. 703, Table 58.
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rapidly.The combination of rapid urban growth with slackened
agricultural growth helped to bring about the rise in the price of farm
products that began in 1896 and thus helped to limit the gains in
urban real wages.25
Douglas is more concerned with explaining the rise in real wages
over the whole period 1890—1926 than with explaining their failure
to rise until 1914. However, in his discussion, he introduces one major
factor, immigration, that clearly operated differently in the two parts
of his period. If, as Douglas believes, the curtailment of immigration
during and after the war caused real wages to rise, the unprecedented
level of immigration just before the war and the low levels of skill and
literacy of the immigrants may well have had an opposite effect.26
This argument is put directly by W. I. King, who estimated from
census data that real annual earnings (money annual earnings de-.
flated by the wholesale price index) declined slightly from 1900 to
1910. He explained his finding in what may well be one of the
purplest passages in the literature of academic economics:
"And so, the dawn of the twentieth century saw the spoilers gazing
longingly from east and west at the riches wrested by American
brawn and brains from the grasp of Nature. The advance guard of
the Asiatics reached our Pacific coast but the forces of labor organized
against the "Yellow Peril" and successfully repelled the invasion.
But into our Atlantic ports, unresisted and almost unheeded, pounced,
at the same time, another army of invaders, the "White Peril" from
Southern and Eastern Europe. And still it comes! Its advance is
marked by no waving banners, no rattle of musketry, and no boom
of artillery, but the army streams in company by company, regiment
by regiment, brigade by brigade and division by division....The
low standard of the Old World tends to force itself upon the New and
turn back the tide of progress."27
This explanation, if soberly stated, is not unreasonable. A great
influx of unskilled labor could both drive down money wages and bid
up the prices of those commodities consumed primarily by the lowest
25Weare indebted to George Soule for pointing out the importance of changes in
agricultural output in this context.
26Forannual estimates of net immigration during this period, see Simon Kuznets and
Ernest Rubin, Immigration and the Foreign Born, Occasional Paper 46, New York,
NBER, 1954.
27WillfordIsbell King, The Wealth and Income of the People of the United States,
New York, 1919, pp. 175—177.
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incomegroups. The real wages of all workers, including the immi-
grants, would tend to fall.28
Before we accept this explanation, however, we should note that in
roughly the same period we are considering available estimates of real
wages for other countries also fail to rise or rise slowly, and these
countries did not have net immigration. The most dramatic case is
the United Kingdom, where Phelps Brown and Hopkins find that
real hourly wages were unchanged from 1890 to 1913.29 These
authors also report a retardation in the increase of real wages after
1886 in three of the four other countries studied, the United States,
France, and Germany.3° This retardation is called "the late nine-
teenth-century climacteric." On the basis of their work on real income
per capita, the authors comment on the change in the movement of
real wages: "One hypothesis can be put aside at the outset: this
change does not seem to have arisen from a change adverse to labour
in the distribution of the national income."3' Thus they disagree with
the basic position of Rubinow and Hansen. Instead they believe that
the "climacteric" resulted from a "check to productivity" and that
this in turn came about because progress in technology had turned
toward new products and away from new processes for making old
products at lower cost.
In so far as this explanation applies to the United States, let us
examine it in the light of productivity data. John W. Kendrick has
recently estimated that total factor productivity (output per unit of
all tangible inputs) in the private domestic economy rose at an average
annual rate of 1.3 per cent a year from 1889 to 1919, and that, over
the same period, the output-labor ratio rose 1.6 per cent annually.32
For manufacturing, Fabricant finds a decrease of 27 per cent in
man-hours per unit of output from 1899 to These rates are
substantially below the corresponding rates for more recent periods,
28However,the real wages of those already on the scene when the immigration began
might tend to rise. The original labor force can, for the most part, be regarded as a factor
(skilled or semiskilled labor) whose real returns rise because of an increased supply of a
complementary factor (unskilled labor).
29E.H. Phelps Brown with Sheila V. Hopkins, "The Course of Wage-Rates in Five
Countries, 1860—1939," OxfordEconomicPapers, n.s. II, 1950, pp. 226—296. The real
wage series for the United Kingdom is based largely on the work of G. H. Wood and
A. L. Bowley.
30Theexception is Sweden. The United States data used for 1890—1913 are from
Douglas, RealWages.
31PhelpsBrown and Hopkins, "Course of Wage-Rates," p.238.
32Thirty-eighthAnnual Report, New York, NBER, 1958, p. 61.
33SolomonFabricant, Employmentin Manufacturing, 1899—1939, NewYork, NBER,
1942, p. 331.
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but they are far above the rates of growth of real wages shown by
Douglas. The 27 per cent fall in the labor-output ratio for manu-
facturing may be compared with a rise of 1 per cent in real hourly
earnings for the same years. The average annual percentage rate of
growth in real wages shown by Douglas for 1890—1919 is 0.4 per cent,
compared with the growth rates for productivity of 1.3 and 1.6 per
cent in Kendrick's estimates. It should be noted that this rise in
average productivity took place despite the immigration of the
unskilled, which should by itself tend to reduce average productivity
as well as real wages.
Whatever the correspondence of estimates of productivity and real
wages for other countries, those for the United States clearly diverge.
It is possible, of course, that real wages were held down by immigra-
tion in the United States at precisely the same time as they were held
down by the lag of productivity in the United Kingdom. However,
the correspondence in timing suggests the possibility of some common
cause, either real or arising from the kinds of data collected and the
statistical procedures used for that period.
There is an especially strong possibility that the similarities of
movement of real wages in the United States and the United Kingdom
arise in part from similar kinds of errors in measuring the cost of
living. In both cases, the official, complete cost-of-living indexes
begin in 1914, and, in both cases, the indexes before that date are put
together from inadequate or fragmentary materials. In Britain, as in
the United States, retail prices were collected before 1914 only for a
few items of food and fuel, and wholesale prices had to be used to
estimate several components of the cost of living.
When, in the exploratory phase of this study, we reviewed the
reasons advanced in the literature for the failure of real wages to rise
appreciably during the period, we were dissatisfied. None of them
seemed compelling enough to rule out the possibility that all the
writers we have cited were seeking to explain something that never
happened. The course of our own work has since made even clearer
to us the temptation to economic statisticians to rationalize in terms
of real forces results that eventually prove to arise from statistical
error. And major sources of possible error seemed to be present in all
the estimates of real wages in the United States before World War I.
On the money wage side, there was the heavy reliance on union rates
34Fora description of the British data, see A. L. Bowley, Wages and Income in the
United Kingdom Since 1860, Cambridge, 1937, Appendix D.
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in a period when unions were relatively unimportant. On the price
side, there was the almost complete reliance on wholesale prices for
nonfoods, and the absence of any series for rents.
It did not seem possible to improve on Douglas's processing of the
materials he used. We therefore decided to construct new estimates
using new sources of data as far as possible. The problem that gave
rise to the study was one of long-term trends, and this has guided our
acceptance or rejection of data. Although our work may have some
value for cyclical problems, it must be used for such problems with
great caution, for, at times, our data or our procedures would be
inadequate or inappropriate for an investigation of cyclical fluctua-
tion.
17